Primary Analysis
Table 1: Models 1-4
(est1 stored)
(est2 stored)
(est3 stored)
(est4 stored)
Table 1: Logistic Regression on Contract Adoption
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
y_signup
5% savings rate 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
10% savings rate 0.123 0.124 0.118 0.111
(0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104)
20% savings rate 0.0934 0.0830 0.0859 0.0771
(0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102)
01 High 0 0
(.) (.)
02 Moderate income 0.347* 0.304*
(0.140) (0.142)
03 Low income -0.222 -0.306
(0.153) (0.158)
01 White 0 0
(.) (.)
02 Black 0.189 0.0853
(0.167) (0.165)
03 Hispanic 0.312 0.233
(0.182) (0.184)
04 Asian -0.0361 -0.143
(0.175) (0.170)
05 Other POC 0.345 0.327
(0.189) (0.193)
01 Homeowner 0
(.)
02 Renter -0.385**
(0.121)
03 Other 0
(.)
Constant 0.314*** 0.217 0.357** 0.201
(0.0820) (0.124) (0.113) (0.136)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observations 2986 2986 2976 2986
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 2: Models 1-4 Odds Ratios
(est1 stored)
(est2 stored)
(est3 stored)
(est4 stored)
Table 2: Odds Ratios
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
y_signup
5% savings rate 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.)
10% savings rate 1.131 1.132 1.125 1.118
(0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.116)
20% savings rate 1.098 1.086 1.090 1.080
(0.111) (0.110) (0.112) (0.110)
01 High 1 1
(.) (.)
02 Moderate income 1.414* 1.355*
(0.198) (0.193)
03 Low income 0.801 0.736
(0.123) (0.116)
01 White 1 1
(.) (.)
02 Black 1.208 1.089
(0.202) (0.180)
03 Hispanic 1.366 1.263
(0.249) (0.232)
04 Asian 0.965 0.867
(0.168) (0.147)
05 Other POC 1.412 1.386
(0.267) (0.268)
01 Homeowner 1
(.)
02 Renter 0.680**
(0.0823)
03 Other 1
(.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observations 2986 2986 2976 2986
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3: Models 5-8
(est1 stored)
(est2 stored)
(est3 stored)
(est4 stored)
Logistic Regression on Contract Adoption
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
y_signup
5% savings rate 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
10% savings rate 0.117 0.118 0.157 0.157
(0.105) (0.105) (0.109) (0.109)
20% savings rate 0.0768 0.0777 0.117 0.120
(0.102) (0.102) (0.107) (0.107)
01 White 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
02 Black 0.168 0.164 0.0908 0.0749
(0.171) (0.171) (0.174) (0.175)
03 Hispanic 0.313 0.321 0.170 0.161
(0.186) (0.186) (0.203) (0.205)
04 Asian -0.0725 -0.0702 -0.0155 0.00504
(0.173) (0.174) (0.186) (0.186)
05 Other POC 0.379 0.377 0.442* 0.444*
(0.194) (0.194) (0.204) (0.204)
01 High 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
02 Moderate income 0.303* 0.308* 0.178 0.177
(0.142) (0.143) (0.149) (0.149)
03 Low income -0.231 -0.231 -0.356* -0.348*
(0.161) (0.161) (0.173) (0.174)
01 Homeowner 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
02 Renter -0.315* -0.326** -0.0908 -0.0694
(0.125) (0.125) (0.132) (0.133)
03 Other 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
10-page contract 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
20-page contract -0.0637 -0.0661 -0.0564
(0.0828) (0.0856) (0.0856)
1-year contract 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
25-year contract -0.222* -0.228* -0.225*
(0.0898) (0.0926) (0.0927)
x_cf=0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
x_cf=250 0.0131 0.0385 0.0419
(0.0855) (0.0905) (0.0909)
01 Less familiar 0 0
(.) (.)
02 More familiar 1.471*** 1.479***
(0.123) (0.123)
01 Less review 0
(.)
02 More review 0.255*
(0.116)
Constant 0.259 0.395* -0.385* -0.560**
(0.139) (0.159) (0.172) (0.188)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observations 2976 2976 2976 2976
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 4: Models 5-8 Odds Ratios
(est1 stored)
(est2 stored)
(est3 stored)
(est4 stored)
Logistic Regression on Contract Adoption
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
y_signup
5% savings rate 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.)
10% savings rate 1.124 1.125 1.170 1.170
(0.118) (0.118) (0.127) (0.128)
20% savings rate 1.080 1.081 1.124 1.127
(0.110) (0.110) (0.120) (0.121)
01 White 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.)
02 Black 1.183 1.178 1.095 1.078
(0.202) (0.201) (0.191) (0.189)
03 Hispanic 1.367 1.378 1.185 1.175
(0.255) (0.256) (0.240) (0.241)
04 Asian 0.930 0.932 0.985 1.005
(0.161) (0.162) (0.184) (0.187)
05 Other POC 1.461 1.458 1.555* 1.558*
(0.283) (0.283) (0.317) (0.319)
01 High 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.)
02 Moderate income 1.354* 1.360* 1.195 1.193
(0.193) (0.194) (0.178) (0.178)
03 Low income 0.794 0.793 0.700* 0.706*
(0.128) (0.128) (0.121) (0.123)
01 Homeowner 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.)
02 Renter 0.730* 0.722** 0.913 0.933
(0.0910) (0.0901) (0.121) (0.124)
03 Other 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.)
10-page contract 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.)
20-page contract 0.938 0.936 0.945
(0.0777) (0.0802) (0.0809)
1-year contract 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.)
25-year contract 0.801* 0.796* 0.799*
(0.0720) (0.0737) (0.0740)
x_cf=0 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.)
x_cf=250 1.013 1.039 1.043
(0.0866) (0.0941) (0.0948)
01 Less familiar 1 1
(.) (.)
02 More familiar 4.355*** 4.388***
(0.534) (0.539)
01 Less review 1
(.)
02 More review 1.291*
(0.149)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observations 2976 2976 2976 2976
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
- Table 1
- Contract length of 25 years compared to 1 year remained a significant deterrent to contract acceptance rates.
- Relative to low income, moderate and higher income respondents were more likely to accept the contract, holding th effect of savings rate, cancellation fee, and contract length constant.
- Table 2
- Contract lenght remained a constant deterrance
- Homeowner status, rent vs homeowner, was not observed as a statistically significant effect on signup rate. Likely some multicollinearity due to effect (sign) varying from model 2 to model 4.
- After including familiarity and reviewed dummies, savings rate becomes statistically significant effect on likelihood of contract adoption.
- More familiar with community solar implies significantly more likely to adopt contract (suggests importance of education) - odds ratio of >4 in model 3 and 4
- In looking at contract adoption by race, Hispanics were the only group observed with a statistically significant effect in models 1 and 2. Relative to white, hispanic rates were higher. This effect is negated after additional IVs are introduces in models 3 and 4.
From Table 1, four models are presented analyzing changes in probability of sign up. Controlling for all other variables, contract length and income were found to have statistically significant effects on the rate of sign up. Contract length was found to have a strong negative impact on probability of contract adoption. For example, holding all variables constant, from model 2 we see that the odds ratio for contract length of 25 years is 0.782, meaning the group with contracts of 25 years are 0.782 times as likely as the group with contracts of 1 year of signing up, or a 21.8% decrease in odds of signing up.
Interestingly, lower income respondents were much less likely to adopt the contract, even when controlling for savings rate, contract length and number of pages, and cancellation fees. High income and medium income respondents were 1.3 and 1.7 times the odds to adopt the contract compared to low income respondents, controlling for contract attributes.